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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4802

GORDON MURPHY,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A95-856-158)

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on February 1, 2007

Before: BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
*IRENAS, District Judge
(Opinion Filed April 25, 2007)

*The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, United States District Judge for the District of
New Jersey, sitting by designation.

OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Gordon Murphy petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), affirming, without opinion, the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for
asylum and withholding of removal. We will deny the petition.
Murphy, a native and citizen of Indonesia of Chinese ethnicity and Buddhist faith,
entered the United States on or about October 14, 2001 as a non-immigrant visitor. On
February 19, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued Murphy a Notice to
Appear, charging that he was subject to removal under Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as a nonimmigrant visitor who
remained for a time longer than permitted. Murphy appeared before the IJ, conceding
removability and seeking relief from removal by filing applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), or, in the alternative,
voluntary departure.
In support of his application for asylum, Murphy offered testimony and other
documentary evidence describing incidents of persecution, violence, and demands for money,
which serve as the basis for his claim of persecution. Specifically, Murphy described
incidents in which he was the victim of violent attacks and robberies, which occurred in his
apartment, at school, and at his place of employment. He also maintains that on the occasions
when he reported these incidents to the authorities, they demanded money in exchange for
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their assistance. Additionally, Murphy described a series of events occurring in April 1998
in which the houses belonging to the native Chinese were burned down at the hands of native
Indonesians. Murphy, however, also testified that he was able to attend school regularly and
later received a degree in industrial engineering from a collegiate institute in Indonesia.
On August 6, 2004, the IJ denied Murphy’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under CAT, and ordered that he voluntarily depart the United States.
On September 30, 2005, the BIA affirmed, without opinion, the IJ’s decision. A timely
petition for review followed, in which Murphy seeks relief from the denial of his application
for asylum and withholding of removal.1
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under § 242 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision
without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. Konan v.
Attorney General, 432 F.3d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 2005).
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien
who demonstrates that he is a refugee. To qualify as a refugee, an alien must establish that
he is unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality because of past persecution or
a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). To

1In his petition for review, Murphy does not raise a claim as to the IJ’s determination
regarding his eligibility for protection under CAT. We therefore deem this claim waived
and address only his claims of asylum and withholding of removal. Vente v. Gonzales,
415 F.3d 296, 299 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005).
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be eligible for asylum on the basis of past persecution, an alien must establish the following:
“(1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is ‘on account of’
one of the statutorily protected grounds; and (3) is committed by the government or forces the
government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272
(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2000)). Likewise, to be
eligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, an alien must establish
that his fear is genuine and that “a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear
persecution if returned to his native country.” Gao, 299 F.3d at 272.
We have adopted a narrow definition of persecution, which includes “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life
or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, “persecution does not
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
unconstitutional.” Id. Thus, whether the alien has demonstrated past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, which
grants significant deference to the IJ’s determinations. Gao, 299 F.3d at 272. As such, the
IJ’s factual findings will be upheld if supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1002)). Likewise, reversal of such
findings is permitted only when the record evidence “would ‘compel’ a reasonable factfinder
to make a contrary determination.” Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir.
2003).
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In this instance, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Murphy failed
to meet his burden of showing that he suffered past persecution or that he has a well-founded
fear of future persecution if returned to Indonesia. On appeal, Murphy points to a number of
incidents that he maintains constituted past persecution and generated a fear of future
persecution, all of which were referred to by the IJ in his decision. In denying Murphy’s
petition for asylum, the IJ considered these incidents and determined that, while credible, they
did not fit within the meaning of persecution, as defined by this Court. In this regard, the IJ
concluded that the evidence offered by Murphy did not establish that the incidents he endured
were based on his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, as required under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). Instead, the IJ found that the
several incidents of mistreatment suffered by Murphy were economically motivated. Thus,
the IJ concluded that Murphy did not qualify as a refugee, making him ineligible for asylum.
Ultimately, this is not a case in which the IJ failed to consider the evidence in the
record. Rather, the IJ concluded that the evidence presented to him did not amount to past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution if Murphy returned to Indonesia.
Because the IJ’s conclusions were based on reasonable and probative evidence in the record,
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they must be upheld under the substantial evidence standard of review.2 We are not
compelled to make a finding contrary to that of the IJ. Therefore, we will deny the petition
for review.

2Because Murphy has not established a well-founded fear of persecution for asylum
purposes, he also has not met the more rigorous standard of eligibility for withholding of
removal. See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2003).
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